Cedarville University

DigitalCommons@Cedarville
Pamphlet Collection
1837

Speech of Mr. Moore, of New York
Ely Moore

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/pamphlet_collection

Recommended Citation
Moore, Ely, "Speech of Mr. Moore, of New York" (1837). Pamphlet Collection. 32.
https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/pamphlet_collection/32

This Pamphlet is brought to you for free and open access
by DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the
Centennial Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pamphlet Collection by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@cedarville.edu.

SPEECH
OF

MR. MOORE, OF NEW YORK,
ON THE

BILL IMPOSING ADDITIONAL DUTIES

AS

DEPOSITORIES IN CERTAIN CASES.

ON

*PUBLIC OFFICERS.

DELIVERED IN THS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OCTOBER 13, 1637.

WASHINGTON:
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Mr. Chairman: It is with a degree of reluctance that 1 solicit the
indulgence of the committee at this late period of the session. It is well
known that, since I have had the honor of a seat in this house, I have
troubled it but seldom with remarks of my own. Indeed, I have long
considered it neither proper nor respectful in any member’of.any legisla
tive body to engross the time to be devoted to public business in speech
making, unless the speaker have it in his power to impart some important
information, or shed new light bn the subject of debate. And here, sir,
I feel bound to confess, that were I now to be governed strictly by this
rule, I would have refrained from participating in this discussion.
Mr Chairman, 1 regret to say, that such is the poor and unprofitable
fashion of the times, that unless the people’s representatives occasionally
make long and lusty speeches, they are but too liable to incur the people’s
displeasure. And for this reason they often deem it expedient to make
elaborate speeches on some given subject, that shall, when printed, occupy
so many columns of a newspaper, or so many pages of a pamphlet. In
order to comply with this requisition, the member is often compelled,
especially when the subject does not happen to be a very fruitful one, or
the speaker does not chance to possess that kind of creative power which
can produce something' out of nothings so to draw out and dilute his ideas,
that the reader, should he judge from their texture and gossamer proper
ties, would be liable to conclude, that, like the spider’s web, they had been
spun rather from .the bowels than the brain. The cause of this evil, sir,
lies, in a great measure, with the people themselves. The representative,
unless he inflicts some half dozen speeches upon the body to which he
may belong, in the course of a session—whether called for or not, whether
to the,purpose or not—returns to his constituents under the apprehension
that he will not receive at their hands the gratifying welcome of ft well
done, good and faithful servant.” The political aspirant, therefore, must
either make up his mind to swim with the current of public opinion, and
speak, often ; or to remain silent, arid sink beneath its waves. And as
legislators, like other men, are more or less moved by self-love, pride, and
ambition—passions upon which hang the fever of thi world, and which
stimulate men to action—they are but too liable to consult their own
rather than their country’s interest, and to embarrass the business of the
nation, by making speeches designed for home consumption^ and their own
political aggrandizement. Sir, I intend no disrespect to the members of
this body, nor to the people who send them here. I but speak of a custom
which I conceive to be justly obnoxious to censure.. I speak of men as
I find them, and as they are. 1 am aware, sir, of the irrelevancy of these
remarks, and will not further occupy the time of the committee by pur
suing them.
Previously to approaching the subject, properly before the committee, I
will briefly notice certain remarks of'the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
(Mr. Naylor,) who has just taken his seat. He has paid high and deserved
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compliments to the workingmen of the north—to their intelligence, and to
their integrity. To those sentiments my heart most cordially responded. He
represented himself to .be a workingman ; he professed great regard for the
interests of workingmen ; he declaimed most energetically in their behalf ;
but he uniformly votes against every measure which they advocate. During
the present session he has voted for the United States Bank; he has ex
pressed his determination to vote against the bill on your table. But he
knows that the workingmen are opposed to the United States Bank; that
they are in favor of the divorce bill, so called; and I feel justified in saying,
that ninety-nine out of every hundred workingmen are favorable to this
bill. Sir, the relation in which I stand to the laboring classes enables me
to judge of their views on this subject. ’ I am in daily correspondence with
workingmen in different parts of the Union ; and 1 know that an unani
mity of opinion and of sentiments in its favor prevails amongst them. Sir,
I cannot conceive how the honorable gentleman can reconcile his pro
fessions with his practice. If he knows the feelings and the opinions of the
workingmen, as he ought to know them; and if he estimates their intelli
gence and their integrity as he professes to estimate them ; why then does
he go counter to their views and to their will? Sir, the laboring classes
have had too many such advocates ! They have been too often flattered
and betrayed by politicians 1 Too often deceived by those who caressed and
bepraised them ! But, sir; the gentleman from Pennsylvania, not content
with eulogizing the laboring men of the north, has made a false issue with
the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Pickens,) by misrepresenting hip
views. Sir, what was the position taken by the gentleman from South
Carolina? I understood him to say that the incorporated monopolies of
the north were inimical to the interests and the liberties of the laboring
classes ; wvere calculated to abridge their natural and political freedom, and
to subject them to a moneyed aristocracy; and, for the expression of these
sentiments, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has thought proper to rebuke
him. But let me tell the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that the laboring
classes of the north are apprehensive of the very evils so ably depicted by
the gentleman from South Carolina. Look at their organs ;, consult their
papers; and you will find that exclusive legislation—that the grants of
chartered monopolies—are regarded by them as hostile to their interests and
dangerous to their liberties. And did not the gentleman from Pennsylva
nia, previous to his election, and during the canvass, did not he intimate his
.opposition to these very moneyed monopolies, now dignified by him under
the title of institutions ? And how has he answered the expectations
which he created by his professions ? By voting for a United States Bank ?
By opposing the bill which proposes to disconnect bank and State! In a
word, by warring with all the principles and opposing all the wishes of the
laboring classes!’ “ If such be thy gods, O 1 Israel 1 wo! wo ! to those who
bow before them!”
1 now1, sir, feel constrained to notice, briefly, some remarks which were
made yesterday by my honorable and much respected colleague (Mr. Hoff
man) while addressing this committee on the bill under consideration. I
understood him to say, sir, that the present Chief Magistrate is, in a great
degree, indebted to the influence of the banks for his political elevation.
Sir, 1 deny the correctness of this assertion. I am satisfied that Martin
Van Buren owes his elevation to his own merits, and to the unbought
.suffrages of a majority of the American people. But, sir. if my colleague
*
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represents this matter truly, and the-election of Mr. Van Buren to the Presi
dency was achieved through bank officers or bank influence, what an
important lesson does it teach us ? And How forcibly does it illustrate the
dangers of the banking system? If banks band together in one political
contest, they may in another, If they unite their energies in behalf of one
individual, they also may unite in behalf of another, without any regard
to his merits, his virtues, or his qualifications, provided he will lend him
self to their interests. This is a fruitful theme, but I will not pursue it atpresent. I now turn to the subject of political changes, on which my col
league has said so much. If I mistake not, he took occasion, to rebuke the
chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means for certain alleged political
somersets, which he is said to have made some few years since. My friend
over the way (Mr. Cambrel eng) is fully competent to defend himself from
the charge, and I shall, therefore, leave this part of the subject in his hands.
On the general topic of political changes, my colleague (Mr. Hoffman) has
all the advantages over me which practice and experience can give. It
would, therefore, be manifestly imprudent for me to enter the lists with so
old and so experienced a tactician in this branch of political science. Did
I desire instruction on this subject, my colleague would be the very first
man to whom I would apply. He should be my preceptor above all others;
for I am satisfied that none can be better qualified than himself, to descant
on the facility with which political changes can be made; none have the
power to speak more feelingly and understandingly on the subject. It was
but a short time since, sir, when my colleague and myself stood foremost
in the ranks of the democracy; when the old wigwam resounded with our
respective voices; when we advocated the same measures and the same
men; when we sang the same political hosannahs* and worshipped at the
same political altar. But, sir, that time has passed ; and my colleague, in
stead of joining with me in the old rallying cry, chooses to lift up his-mu
sical voice in a political palinode; and we now find ourselves planted foot
to foot as political opponents, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder, as
political associates, as we were wont to stand. In the course of his re
marks, my colleague discoursed right eloquently on the calamities of the
times and on the sufferings of the people. But on this topic he is not singuJar nor alone. - All his whig brethren have strenuously emulated each other
in their extraordinary professions of peculiar love for the patient people.
When I reflect on the wonderful solicitude manifested .by the members of
the opposition for the welfare of the nation, I cannot withhold an expres
sion of admiration at the patriotic and benevolent spirit which pervades
and warms and expands their benevolent bosoms.
We have heard gentlemen from the East and the West, from the North
and the South, mingling their notes of lamentation over the sufferings of
the unfortunate wherever found. Every fibre of their heads and hearts,
every feeling of their souls and bodies, appears to be attuned to benevolence,
and to vibrate with deepest sympathy at the calamities which they assure
us have befallen our common country. Sir, these are honorable feelings,
and highly creditable to human nature. Patriotism so exalted, philanthropy
so generous, sympathy so sincere, benevolence so pure, holy, and disinter
ested, cannot fail to challenge our warmest admiration. When we heal
men sincerely deplore the misfortunes of their fellows, we cannot but
admire, honor, and respect them. But how are these feelings of respect
and admiration strengthened and augmented when we behold them exerting
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their utmost energies in behalf of the unfortunate; when we see them
prmptly and eagerly rushing to the rescue?
And, sir, here I must be permitted to intimate to my political opponents,
that in order firmly to establish their characters for superior patriotism and
philanthropy, it will be necessary for them to act as well as to feel. If you
know the remedy, gentlemen, and apply it not, the sincerity of your pro
fessions may be doubted. , The uncharitable may surmise that party is
your object, and public good the scapegoat. Sir, what would we think of
the patriotism of the man who was able, but unwilling, to succour his
country in the hour of her extremity ? Or what would we say of the
benevolence of a physician who refused to administer to his sick and dying
patient, the remedies which he knew would restore him to life, health, and
vigor? And are not gentlemen aware, that after having,so constantly, so
earnestly, and so eloquently, bewailed the fallen fortunes of their country,
they will naturally be looked to by that country with anxious shuddering
solicitude for the reinedies competent to heal the deep disease, which, we
are told, is preying upon its vitals ? Are they not aware that thbir benev
olence will be questioned, and their sincerity doubted, even by the confiding
and the faithful ?
But, sir, we have been told that the friends of the. administration have
the power, and that the responsibility rests with them I Sir, what are we to
understand by this ? Is it meant to be insinuated that the administration
party in this house have the power to relieve the distresses of this country,
but that they have not the will to exercise it ? Is it meant to be affirmed
that the dominant party are so utterly destitute of feeling and of patriotism,
as willingly and intentionally to withhold the aid which they might right
fully and constitutionally extend to the people ? Is it their intention to
represent us to the American people in so odious and offensive a light ?
Sir, I am aware that the gentlemen in the opposition have long claimed ah
the wisdom, and all the worth, and all the decency; but I did not suppose,
until now, that they also claimed ail.the patriotism, and all the benevolence,
and all the sympathy.
For one, sir, 1 protest against such unwarrantable and unfounded pre
tensions. I am clearly against this additional monopoly. If the gentlemen
really possess all the charity and benevolence which they claim, I trust
that they will not be inexorable towards us; that they will not thrust us
beyond the pale of humanity; that they will not strip us of all the common
attributes of civilized men, nor paint us as savages or brutes, by represent
ing us to be deaf or indifferent to the voice of distress. Why should we be
thus treated as guilty of the 'grossest injustice—of the most flagrant inhu
manity? If the gentlemen of the opposition do not consider adequate
the means of relief proposed by the Executive, let them suggest such as
will be effective, and, .my life on it, if these means shall be just, proper, and
constitutional, the friends of the administration will cheerfully yield them
their most cordial and hearty support. We confess that we know no other
remedies for the ills complained of than those we have already suggested.
And if the gentlemen in the opposition have it in their power, as they
would have us ahd the country believe, of proposing an efficacious and
constitutional remedy, for heaven’s sake let them tell us what it is 1 If
there be a balm in Gilead—if there be a physician there—let him adminis
ter the balm to our afflicted country. Do not, I beseech you, gentlemen, do
not any longer keep secret your political catholicon. like quack physicians;

blit, like, good and true patriots, make it publicly known, that it may be
employed for the healing of tHe nation.
My colleague has pronounced the sub-treasury system unconstitutional^
but did not attempt to prove it so. Now, sir, by way of a set off, 1 pro
nounce unconstitutional the substitute of my colleague, a national bank;
and so I shall endeavor to prove it by calm and dispassionate -argument.
A national bank, being the principal antagonist measure to the bill wilder
discussion, I shall confine my remarks principally to that subject ; and, as
this is the only point that has not been fully and thoroughly discussed in
the progress of this debate, there will be the greater propriety in this course.
I shall, therefore, attempt to argue at length this part of the subject.
I can find no authority in the constitution for granting charters of incor
poration, of whatever narpe/kind, or description ; and no honorable geritle'man, I presume, will hazard the declaration that such power is directly given
to Congress by the constitution. The most hardy and reckless advocates
of a'national bank have never ventured to affirm that such power was spe
cific and direct—that the warrant was express. They all resort to the doc
trine of implication and construction. Sir, let us examine this doctrine ;
let us take up the constitution in a spirit of honesty and soberness, and see
what clause of that instrument, if any, vests in Congress even an implied
power to incorporate a national bank
Sir, I am aware of the vastness of the subject which T propose to examine.
I am aware that the constitutionality of a national bank has been repeatedly
discussed by the most eminent jurists and statesmen of the nation. Arid
I am also aware that an attempt, on my part, to grapple with a subject of
such magnitude, arid under such circumstances, will be attributed by many
to a want of discretion, if not to a culpable vanity. Be it so. I conceive
it to be my duty—I know it to be my right—to express my views fully on
this subject ; and, although I may be unable to shed any additional light
bn this Jong agitated arid vexations question, yet I will, nevertheless,
state the arguments and considerations which exert a controlling influ
ence on my judgment. Permit me then, sir, to call, for a moment, the
attention of the committee to the peculiar character of our Government.
It is conceded by all parties, I believe, to be a government of limited and
specified powers; which powers are expressly prescribed by the constitu
tion. To the constitution, then, and to the constitution alone, must Con
gress look for all and every power they would exercise. Unless, there
fore, the power to grant charters of incorporation be expressly granted by
the constitution, the exercise of such power, on the part of Congress, would
be a violation of that instrument. But, say gentlemen, although we do not
pretend to assert, that the power to incorporate is given in direct terms to
Congress by the constitution, we contend, nevertheless, that such power is
derived by fair and legitimate construction. But, when the advocates of
this doctrine have been called upon to designate the clause of the consti
tution which confers on Congress the power to incorporate a bank, they
have been sadly puzzled to comply with the requisition, but have wan
dered arid wandered from article to article, and from clause to clause,
seeking in vain,for authority. When driven from one position they flee to
another ; ever vacillating ; never fixed in their views ; never satisfied with
their own, nor with each others’ arguments. No unity of opinion prevails
among them as to the particular clause in the constitution, where this doc
trine of construction and implication, authorizing acts of incorporation, is

to bo found : but, like certain deluded ones of old, one cries, lo! it is here—
and another, lo! it is there; when, as was the case with the asses of
Kish, it happens to be “ nowhere.” But, sir, let us examine those parts of
the constitution where this power is said to reside. Some have attempted
to locate it in the first article of the eighth section of the constitution, which
gives Congress the power “ to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general
welfare of the United States.” The power to “ lay and collect taxes” and
to “ pay the debts of the United States in other words, the power to raise
and appropriate money, and the power to grant charters of incorporation,
1 believe never have been, and I presume never will be, regarded as synony
mous, even by the most desperate “ constructionists.” Those, therefore,
who pretend to find authority to grant charters of incorporation, in the
article under consideration, must look for it in the words “ common de
fence and general welfare.” And it is from these words that some pretend
to derive the power to incorporate a national bank. Can those who have
contended for this construction have considered well of the consequences
which must inevitably follow from an exercise of such implied powers? Have
they reflected, that, by giving to these words the construction they contend
for, they render the enumerated powers of the constitution nugatory? that
they virtually annul the powers reserved to the State Governments? break
down all the constitutional guards designed to protect the rights of the
States, and of the people, and make the constitution itself, in the hands of
Congress, what clay would be in the hands of the potter? And, lastly, have
they considered that this doctrine is-flatly contradicted by the tenth amend
ment to the constitution, which expressly declares that “the powers not de
legated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people?” General
Hamilton, latitudinarian as he was on the subject of construction, had too
much regard for his reputation to give to the words, “to provide for the
common defence and general welfare,” a construction that would confer on
Congress powers not enumerated in the constitution. By reference to his
report on manufactures, it will be found that he confines, in every instance,
the application of these words to the power given by the firstsentence of
the clause; and in this particular Mr. Jefferson agrees with him. The lat
ter,'in adverting to this subject, calls it “ a grammatical quibble, which has
countenanced the General Government in a claim of universal power.. For,
continues he, in the phrase to lay taxes, lo pay the debts, and provide, for
the general welfare, it is a mere question of syntax, whether the two last
infinitives are governed by the first, or are distinct and co-ordinate powers;
a question unequivocally decided by the exact definition of powers imme
diately following.” Sir, I conceive that the clause of the constitution un
der consideration admits of but two constructions; the one, limiting the
powers of Congress, as contended by General Hamilton and, Mr. Jeffer
son; the other, conferring on Congress powers incompatible with the spirit,
and utterly subversive of all the express powers of the.constitution—pow
ers independent of, and paramount to, the constitution itself-—powers inde
finite, boundless, omnipotent. If the latter construction be admitted, the
will of Congress, and not the constitution, is the law of the land. Or, if,
peradventure, Congress should think it expedient to revert to the constitu
tion at all, it would only be necessary to refer to that part of it containing
the cabalistic words “ common defence and general welfare.” And as these
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words, according to certain commentators, convey a plenary power.on all
subjects, and are applicable to all cases that come within the jurisdiction
of the national legislature, it would be quite unnecessary to look further.
This would be economical, withal—saving much precious time to the peo
ple’s representatives, which otherwise might be squandered in wandering
about the constitutional kingdom in search (as well search for the lost pleiad)
of the enumerated powers, which, unfortunately, have been swallowed up by
the implied powers discovered in the words “common defence and general
welfare.” Let us suppose the doctrine here combatted to be established
and carried out into practical legislation. Congress is applied to by a
number of influential individuals for an act of incorporation, granting to
them and to their successors and assigns forever, the sole and exclusive
right, extending to all the States in the Union, of smelting iron ore with
anthracite coal, and of manufacturing the same. The memorialists set
forth in their petition the immense benefits that would result to the nation
from their contemplated enterprise. They dwell upon the advantages in
cident to associated capital, and concentrated wisdom and.industry. • They
represent, that the mining interest of the country would be benefitted in
proportion to the extent of the monopoly—inasmuch as the products of the
iron and coal mines would ever find a ready, market at the company’s
works; that the public in general would be enabled to obtain the manufac
tured articles at a much cheaper rate and of a better quality ; and that, in
time of war, arms and ordnance could be furnished with greater facility, and
of superior temper and calibre. The' States, notwithstanding all these
plausible representations, remonstrate—individuals remonstrate. The
States urge that the grant would be a violation of their reserved rights,
and the principle upon which the Union was founded; and demand of
Congress'the source whence the power is derived to grant such charter of
incorporation ? Congress very complacently point them to the potent
words 11 common defence and general welfare,” and the thing is settled. In
dividuals represent, that an equality of civil and political rights constitute
the basis of purely democratical governments ; that none but equal laws
can legitimately-flow from the principle of equal rights ; and that all laws,
which invade that principle, conflict with the spirit of our institutions, and
are, to all intents and purposes, legislative frauds upon the rights of the peo
ple ; and, consequently, utterly destitute of constitutional sanction. „ They
•further show, that an exercise of power, such as asked for by the petitioners,
would confer exclusive privileges and legislative favors—infringe on their
natural and political rights—-violate the sacred principles of justice and
political equality, and, for this reason, be clearly unconstitutional. But
Congress, regardless of the truth and propriety of these representations,
grant the charter of incorporation, and when called upon to show their
constitutional right to do so, triumphantly refer to the magical words “com
mon defence and general welfare,” and there the matter ends. I have put
this case for the purpose of illustrating the evils consequent upon an as
sumption of power, such as contended for by those who maintain that the
clause we have been examining authorizes Congress to establish a federal
bank. And, as legislators are as much subject to infirmities as other men,
and the world not having, as yet, approached that desirable state of which
Plato dreamed—“ the perfectibility of man”—it is not only possible, but very
probable, that cases of this kind might frequently happen. Nor can those
who contend for the principle which merges all power in the words “ com-

mon defence and general welfare,” or, what amounts to the same thing—
in the will of Congress,—object to any case coming within that principle,
Woweyer dangerous and pernicious in its consequences. As this clause of
the constitution has been, and is still much relied oh by the advocates of a
United States Bank, I will take the liberty of introducing such authority
in Opposition to their views, as will, 1 trust, have weight, both with this
house and the nation. The fourth resolution'passed by the General As
sembly of Virginia, in December, 1798, reads as follows :
“ That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret, that a spirit has in sundry
instances been manifested by the Federal'Government, to enlarge its powers by forced con
structions of the constitutional charter which defines them; and that indications have'appeared
of ‘a design to expound certain general phrases (which having been copied from the very
limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation, were the less liable to be mis
construed,) So as to destroy the meaning and dffect of the particular enumeration which ne
cessarily explains and limits the general phrases; and so as to consolidate the States, by de
gress, into one sovereignty; the obvious tendency, and inevitable result of which would be to
transform the present republican system of the United States into an absolute, or at best a mix
ed monarchy.”

Mr. Madison, in his report commenting bn this resolution, observes:
“ The first question here to be considered is, whether a spirit has in sundry instances been
manifested by the Federal Government to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the
constitutional charier.
.
“ The general assembly having declared their opinion merely,.by regretting in general
terms, that forced constructions.for enlarging the federal.powers have taken place; it does
not appear to the committee necessary to go into a specification of every instance to which the
resolution may allude. The alien and sedition acts, being particularly named in a succeeding
resolution, are of course to be understood.as included in the allusion. Omitting others which
have less occupied public attention, or been less extensively, regarded as unconstitutional, the
resolution may be presumed to refer particularly to the bank law, which, from the circum
stances of its passage, as well as the latitude5 Qf construction on which it is founded, strikes the
attention with singular force ; and the carriage tax, distinguished also by circumstances in its
history having a similar tendency.”
.
* ,
*.
*
*
*
■'*
*
*
“1. The general phrases here meant must be those “of providing for the common defence
and general welfare.”
...
“In the ‘Article of Confederation,’ the phrases are.used as follows, in Art. VIII: ‘All
charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence and
general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out
of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in proporlipn to the value
of all land within each State, granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as such land and the
buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United
Slate's in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint.’
“In the existing constitution, they make the following part of sec. 8: ‘ The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,,and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for
the common 'defence and general welfare of the United States.’
“ This similarity in the use of these phrases in the two great federal charters, might well be
considered as rendering their meaning less liable to be misconstrued in the latter; because it
will scarcely be said, that in the former, they were ever understood to be either a general grant
of power, w lo authorize tlie requisition dr application of money by the old Congress to the
common defence and general welfare, except in. cases afterwards enumerated,. which explained
and limited their meaning, and if such was the limited meaning attached to these phrases in the
very instrument revised and remodelled by the present constitution, it can never be supposed
that when copied into this constitution, a different meaning ought to be attached to them.
“ That, notwithstanding this remarkable security against misconstruction, a design has been
indicated toexpound these’ phrases in the constitution; so as to destroy the effect of the particular
enumeration of powers ’ by which it explains and limits them, . must have fallen under the
observation of those who have attended to the course of. public transactions. Not to multiply
proofs on this subject, it will suffice to refer to the debate’s of the federal legislature, in which
arguments have on different occasions been.drawn, with apparent effect, from-these phrases,
in their indefinite meaning.—Elliot's Debates, vol. 4. p. 577—8.
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Again? the samedistipguished personage, in a letter to Mr. Steverisdnz
dated November 27, 1830, in whichlhe examines the origin and progress
of the clause under consideration, remarks that:
“ A special proyisiofl, says Mr. Madison, could not have been necessary for the debts of thenew
Congress; for a power to provide 'money, and a power to perform certain acts, of which
money is the ordinary and appropriate means, must, of.course, carry with, them a power to
pay the expense of performing the acts. Nor was any special provision for debts proposed,
till the case of the revolutionary debts was1 brought into view; and it is a fair presumption,
from the course of the varied propositions which have been noticed,'that but for the old debts,
and their association with.the terms, ‘common defence and general welfare,’ the clause would
have remained, as reported in'the first draught of a constitution, expressing generally ‘ a power
in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises,’ without any addition of the
phrase ‘ to provide for the common defence and general welfare.’ With this addition, indeed,
the language of the clause being in conformity with that of the clause in the articles of con
federation, it would be qualified, as in those articles, by the specification of powers subjoined
to it. But there is-sufficient reason to suppose, that the terras'in question would not have
been introduced, but for the introduction of the old. debts, with which they happened to stand/in
a familiar, though inoperative relation. Thus introduced, however, they pass undisturbed
through the subsequent stages of the constitution.
“If it be asked, why the terms 1 common defence and general welfare,’ if not meant to.con
vey the comprehensive power, which, taken literally, they express, were not qualified and ex
plained by some reference to the particular power subjoined, the .answer is.at hand, that al
though it might easily have been done, and experience shows it might be well if it had been
done, yet the omission is accounted1 for by an inattention to the phraseology, occasioned, doubt
less, by the identity with the harmless character attached to it in the instrument, from which
it was borrowed.
- . “ But may it not be asked with infinitely more propriety, and without the possibility' of a
■satisfactory answer, why, if the terms were meant to embrace, not only all the powers par
ticularly expressed, but the indefinite power which has been claimed under them, the intention
was not so declared; why, oh that supposition,"so much critical labor... was employed in enu
merating the particular-powers, and in defining and limiting their extent?

*

*

$

*

*

4-

*

“ The obvious conclusion, to/which we are brought, is, that these terms, copied from the ar
ticles of confederation, were regarded in the new, as in the old instrument, merely as general
terms, explained and limited by the subjoined specification^, and therefore requiring no critical
attention or studied precaution.

*

*

■*

*

*

*

*

*

■

“Mr. Wilson, justly distinguished for his intellectual powers, being deeply impressed with
the importance of a bank at such a crisis, published a small pamphlet, entitled ‘ Considerationsoh the Bank of North America,’ in which he endeavored to derive the power frdm the nature
of the Union in which the colonies were declared and became independent States ; and also
from the tenor of the ‘ articles of confederation’ themselves. But'what is particularly worthy
of notice is, that with all his anxious search in those articles for such a power, he never
glanced at the terms ‘common defence and general welfare,’as a source of it.”’—Elliot's De
bates, vol. 4, pp. 646—7.

And here, sir, 1 think I may safely rest tins part of the subject.
The second paragraph of the 8th section of the constitution, which vests
in Congress the power “to borrow money on the credit of the United
States,” has also been appealed to by the friends of a national bank. But
as nothing like an argument has ever been adduced in support of this posi
tion, as it rests upon mere conjecture, without the shadow of authority to
support it, and as a bill to charter a bank is not a bill to bofrow money, I
will not trouble the Committee with any further remarks on this point, but
proceed to examine the third paragraph of the Sth section of the constitu
tion, which gives Congress the power “ To regulate commerce with
foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”
This clause has been appealed to by the advocates of internal improve
ments, as authorizing Congress to construct roads and canals, &c ; it has
also been appealed to by the friends of the tariff system, as vesting in Con
gress an implied power to protect our domestic manufactures ; and lastly,
it has been appealed to, as authorizing Congress to establish a United'States
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Bank. Now, sir, in my humble opinion; the power to regulate commerce.
does not include the power to make internal improvements of the character
just noticed—to protect manufactures, by imposing a tariff—nor to establish
a national bank. Neither the clause immediately under consideration, nor
any other found in the constitution, authorizes Congress, in my judgment,
to do either of those three things. Sir, is it meant to be affirmed, that the
power to “ regulate commerce,’.’ includes the power to regulate the cur
rency of the several States ? If so, then is Congress authorized, under the
power to “regulate commerce,” to regulate the issues of all the State
banks—for these constitute the principal currency of. the country; on the
other hand, if it be meant that Congress have not the power, under this clause
of the constitution, to regulate the currency, how can it be said that Congress
are thereby authorized to charter a bank for the purpose of regulating com
merce, when the only object of a national bank, as we are told, is to regulate
and equalize the exchanges and currency .of the country ? Again : If the
power “to regulate commerce” includes the power to incorporate a bank, why
may it not also include the power to grant charters of incorporation for other
purposes? Why not authorize Congress to incorporate companies for objects
of internal improvements—for manufactures—or, what would appear to be
rather more congenial, for ordinary commercial purposes? If Congress
can, by this clause of the constitution, authorize one set of men, under an
act of incorporation, to deal in bank paper, they possess equally the power
to authorize another set to deal in silks and satins, calicoes and. ginghams.
Nor can this position be controverted. The stockholders and agents of a
bank are as much traffickers and dealers in paper money, which is a
species of commercial commodity, as merchants are in, broadcloths and
cassimeres. If an act of incorporation, therefore, can be claimed in the one
case, as a proper and necessary means to “ regulate commerce,” it unques
tionably can in the other. But the clause in question confers no such power.
The power to “regulate commerce,” and the power to grant charters of incor
poration are separate and distinct. The former is conferred by the con
stitution, the latter is not. Sir, what was the nature of the power which
the framers of the constitution intended to confer on Congress by this
clause? Evidently, to authorize Congress to prescribe or establish certain
rules by which commerce should be governed. But will it be pretended
that the authors of the constitution meant that this power, which they
vested in Congress alone, should be transferred by Congress to an incorpo
rated company? That a chartered company should possess the exclusive
power of regulating the commercial interests of the nation ? of prescribing
rules for its government? of determining the principles on which it should
be conducted ? and thus place one of the great interests of the country
beyond legislative and constitutional control? No one, I presume, will
say, in direct terms, that such was the intention of the framers of the con
stitution ; and yet such is the inevitable result to which the doctrine of con
struction, here combatted, leads/ If such rules of construction prevail, it
will be impossible to define the limits of the power of the federal government
under the clause, “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce,” &c. I
will conclude my remarks on this clause, by reading from Mr. Jefferson’s of
ficial opinion on the constitutionality of a United States Bank, the follow
ing extract:
“ To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who erects a bank
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creates a subject of coilitncrte in its bills: so does he who makes a bushel'of wheat, or digs a
dollar out of the mines. Yet neither ’of these persons regulate commerce thereby. To make a.
thing which may be bought and sold, is not to prescribe regulations for buying and selling. Be*
sides, if this were an exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending
as much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For the power given to
Congress by the constitution, does not extend to the internal regulation of the commerce of a
State, (that is to say, of the commerce between citizen and citizen,) which remains exclusively
with its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say, its commerce with
another State, or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. Accordingly, the bill does
not propose the measure as a ‘ regulation of trade/ but as ‘productive of considerable advan
tage to trade.’ ”

Some have attempted to locate the power to incorporate a national bank—
Mr. McDuffie, for example, in his report of 1830,. as chairman of the Com*
mittee of Ways and Means—on the fifth article of the eight.section of the
constitution, which gives Congress the power “ to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and mea
sures
“ The power to * coin money and fix the value thereof,’ is expressly and exclusively vested
in Congress. This grant was evidently intended to invest Congress with the power of regu
lating the circulating medium. ‘Coin’ was regarded, at the peripd of framing the constitu
tion, as synonymous with ‘currency,’ as it was then generally believed that bank notes could
only be maintained in circulation by being the true, representative of the precious metals. The
word ‘coin,’ therefore, must be regarded as a particular term, standing as the representative
of a general idea.”-—Rep. H. R. 1st Sess: 21st Cong. No. 358,' Vol. 3, p. 6.

Now, sir, if “coin and currency are synonymous,” signifying the same
thing, if coin be currency and currency coin, Congress is vested with the
power “to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign currency?
According to this reading, Congress is authorized, not only to regulate the
currency of this country, which consists principally of bank notes, blit also
the currency of other nations, whatever symbols of industry they may
select as mediums of exchange. The chairman of the Committee of Ways
and Means appears to have been as much at fault in his knowledge of the
currency, properly considered, as of the character and powers of the con
stitution'; otherwise he would not have confounded bank notes with coin—
the pretended representative with the thing represented. I say the pretended
representative, because the amount of paper money afloat, exceeds, at least,
five times the amount of specie wherewith to redeem it. It is not, there
fore, strictly speaking, a representative of coin, or real money. It has be
come rather an instrument of speculation, than a measure or representative
of value. The currency of a country in order to be sound, as every polit
ical economist knows; ought to be equal to the precious metals, or to con
sist of the metals themselves. But the paper currency of this country is,
and was even during the existence of the late United States Bank, but the
mere supposititious representative of property. That paper money can
never become a proper standard of value, is evident from the fact that it is
constantly liable to fluctuation, depreciation, expansion, and contraction.
And would it be doing justice to the framers of the constitution—to their
sagacity and integrity—-so to construe that instrument, or any part thereof,
as to authorize Congress to make paper credit, of whatever kind or descrip
tion, a standard of value ? The only standard or measure of value known
to the constitution is gold and silver ; a standard, by the way, which has
been recognised and adopted from the earliest ages, by all civilized nations
throughout the world. If Congress are authorized, to incorporate a com-

‘pany, which shall possess the independent and sovereign right to coin or
manufacture money, and regulate the value thereof, why may they not also
invest such corporationswith power to control the commerce of the, country
in all such exchangeable articles or commodities that may properly come un
der the standard of weights and measures ? Why not go still farther—for if
Congress can delegate to a corporation this prime attribute of sovereignty,
the establishment of a standard of value—why not, I say, extend it to every
other specified power of the constitution ? For, I repeat it, if Congress
have the power, under this or any other clause of the constitution, to dele
gate to a corporation of its own creating any one of the enumerated pow
ers, they may, with equal propriety, delegate to it every other power. Let
Congress recognise this construction, and what would be the consequence?
Sir, we should no longer be a nation of freemen, living under a free con
stitution ; but the slaves of soulless corporations. An independent and
irresponsible power would be established in the land ; the restraints and
limitations imposed upon Congress, by the constitution, would be over
thrown ; and the foundations of your Government not only rocked, but
riven.
Sir, let us examine a little farther the extraordinary argument urged by
Mr. McDuffie in support of bis most extraordinary position. “ Coin,” says
he, l( was regarded, at the period of framing the constitution, as synonymous
with currency, as it was then generally believed that bank notes could only
be maintained in circulation by being the true representatives of the pre
cious rhetals,” What I sir. coin and currency—coin and paper moneycoin and bank notes regarded as one and the same thing, as synony
mous, at the time of framing the constitution ? What! “ generally be
lieved at that period,” that paper money was “the true representative of
the precious metals?” Sir, does not the whole history of “ that period”
contradict these reckless and unfounded assertions ? I appeal to the histori
cal recollections of every gentleman on this floor, if it does not. Is it not
notorious that the framers of the constitution were emphatically hard money
men ? Is it not notorious that gold and silver are the only currency recogniesd by the constitution ? Is it not known to all, that Congress have no
power, under the constitution, to authorize any individual, company, or
corporation, to issue federal paper money ? Every part of the constitution
which relates to.the subject of money is clear, explicit, and unequivocal.
The intention of the framers of the constitution, on this subject, is not only
made manifest by the letter of the constitution itself, but also by a law
passed immediately after the meeting of the first Congress under the con
stitution, which defines the kind of money to be received by the federal
Treasury. This law provides “ that the fees and duties payable to the Gov
ernment, shall be received in gold and silver coin ONLY.” This statute,
be it remembered, was passed within one month after Congress had assem
bled. And again, the law in reference .to that part of the revenue accruing
from the sale of the public lands, passed in 1800, declares that .specie and
evidences of the public debt, shall alone be received in payment of such
lands- These twdacts relating to the subject of the federal revenue, passed
immediately after the. adoption of the constitution, ought and. must be re
garded as unerring interpreters of that instrument, so far as the point im
mediately .under consideration. is concerned. If the members of the first
Congress regarded paper money and “ coin” as synonymous, why did they
enact that gold, and. silver coin, only should, be received, in payment of the
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federal revenue,1? If they even considered paper money, or bank notes, aS
synonymous with coin, as contended by Mr/ McDuffie, they appeared, at
all events, to discriminate between paper coin and gold and silver com, by
making the latter only receivable in payment of the public dues. So that
“ gold and silver coin,” and not paper coin, appear to be the only currency
known to the constitution ; or to the laws of Congress which define the
kind of currency to be received-in payment of the federal revenues.
I would now call the, attention of the committee, for a few moments, to
the last paragraph of the 8th section of the constitution : “ To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper to carry into effect theforegoingpowers.”
It will not be pretended, I apprehend, that.this clause vests in Congress any
newsubstantive power; or that it in any wise supersedes or invalidates any
one of the enumerated powers. This position would be too extravagant—too
monstrous, for even modern sophists to take. It will, I trust, be conceded, that
the powers comprehended'in this clause are subordinate and incidental in
their nature, merely conferring on Congress the right to exercise such
means as shall be strictly necessary and proper to execute the express
powers-, or, without which, the,powers expressly granted cannot be carried
into effect. This point yielded, as yielded it must be, the question arises,
whether a national bank be a necessary and proper mean to carry into
effect any of the specified powers ? In order to show that it is necessary,
essential, indispensable, it must be made to appear that the enumerated
powers cannot be carried into effect independent of a national bank. Ex
perience has demonstrated that they can, one and all. And, in the second
place, in order to prove that a national bank is a proper means, it must be
shown that the power, to create it is an incidental and not a substantive
power; which, I apprehend, cannot,be done. No, sir, it cannot be shown
that the power to grant charters of incorporation, is merely an incidental
or subsidiary power. Among all the powers, enumerated in the constitu
tion, 1 defy gentlemen to designate a solitary one that is capable of being
wielded with more potent effect; not for good, but for evil. If Congress
possess the power to grant a charter of incorporation, in their national
capacity, in one case, they do in another. If they possess it at all, they
possess it without limit, and can. extend it, whenever they think proper, to
any and every object whatever; whether it be in derogation of State and
individual rights, to a Mississippi land monopoly, to a monopoly of the trade
of the Indies, or to the cod and whale fisheries. Sir, what is the distin
guishing characteristics of incorporations? They are essentially aristo
cratic in their nature; being invested with exclusive privileges—privileges
withheld from .the rest of society. They are allowed to purchase and hold
teal estate; which the United States themselves cannot do without obtaining
the .consent of the, S tates. They are. allowed to hold property in mortmain,
and. are capable, of being so organized or constituted as to change the
course .of descent in the several States; I mean where their corporate
character is concerned. Nor is this all: so sacred are their rights held, and
so carefully guarded.are they by the legislature and judiciary, that they
cannot be reached by law without permission on their parts: nay, more,
they are even placed beyond the control of future legislatures—at! east, such
is the opinion of some. And yet we are told that a power, to incorporate—a
power of such great and fearful magnitude, and' capable of producing
so much mischief—is, after.all, a mere.incident of a power! Think you,
sir,.that if the members of the convention, who framed the constitution,
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had considered a national bank either a proper or necessary means to carry
into effect any of the enumerated powers of the constitution, that they
would have rejected a direct proposition to establish a bank, or refused to
invest CohgreSs with power to grant charters of incorporation, of whatever
description? Is it probable that wise and patriotic men would have acted
so inconsistently—so absurdly? “It is known/’ says Mr. Jefferson, “that
the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end, by the
convention which framed the constitution.” “k proposition,” he adds, “was
made to them to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amendatory
one to empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected ; and
one of the reasons of rejection urged in debate was, that they then would
have power to erect a bank.” Here then, sir, is authority not to be ques
tioned, not to be controverted, that the power to erect a bank, “proposed
as a means, was rejected as an end,” by the very authors of the constitu
tion itself. The fact, therefore, that the framers'of the constitution
deliberately and designedly withheld from Congress the power to incorpo
rate a bank, utterly excludes the idea that such power was intended to be
granted, either expressly or incidently, specifically or impliedly. To con
tend that a power, intentionally withheld from Congress by the framers of
the constitution, can be rightfully exercised by Congress, is to outrage
common sense, and all approved rules of construction. Let the principle
be once established, that neither the express letter of an instrument, nor
the evident intention of its author or authors, is to be taken as evidence of
its meaning, and all written constitutions, contracts, laws, and charters,
become a dead letter. I would entreat gentlemen to consider well before
they give further countenance to such doctrines. I would respectfully
remind them, that by disregarding the express provisions of the constitu
tion, and the evident intention of its framers, and resorting to construction
and implication alone for authority, they will eventually raise up a monu
ment of folly, which, if not as impious, will create as much confusion as
that which towered on Shitiar’s plain. Let it not be supposed, however,
that I would deny the existence of all implied powers. I am aware, sir,
that the convention, in framing the constitution, marked out and enu
merated the principal ends of Government, without particularizing all
the means by which these ends were to be secured. A discretionary
power, io a certain extent, must necessarily be left with Congress.
The constitution, for example, has. vested in Congress the power to raise
and support armies. But at what time armies are to be raised, to what
extent,, and for what cause this power is to be exercised, it has necessarily
left to be determined by the national legislature. /Many other cases might
be cited, Where the means necessary to. carry into effect the enumerated
powers are left to the. selection of Congress. But the mean, or incidental
power, ought, in all cases, to bear a due relationship to the specified power.
It was well remarked by a distinguished Senator (Mr. Clay)-in debate, that:
“ In all cases where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought to
be congenial with' each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought
to be strictly subordinate, and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specified power.
In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power im
plied ought not to be made to embrace other objects', which are not specified in the constitution.
If, then, you Could establish a bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly
restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution.
“ I contend that the States have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the
capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of

debtors to their creditors. If Congress have the power to erect an artificial body, and say it
shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual—if you can bestow on this object of your
own creation the ability to contract, may you not, in contravention of State rights, confer upon
slaves, infants, and femes coven, the ability to contract 1 And if you have the power to say
that an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts only in a certain limited
degree, what is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals'! Where is the
limitation upon this power to set up corporations ? You establish one in the heart of a State,
the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others, whose capital shall consist of
land, slaves, and personal estates, and thus the whole properly' within the jurisdiction of a State
might be absorbed by these political bodies. The existing bank contends, that it is beyond the
power of a State to tax it - and, if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power of Con
gress, by chartering companies, to dry up all the sources of State revenue.”

Yes, sir, the honorable Senator was right, when he said that the incidental
power ought to be strictly subordinate, and limited to the end proposed to
be attained by the specified power. He Was right in saying, that in all cases
where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought
to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. And
he would have been equally right, had he added, that no means can be
proper that are not compatible with the spirit of the constitution and the
genius of our government. But I will no longer detain the committee on
this branch of the subject, having already shown, as I believe, beyond all
cavil, that the clause which has been last examined does not confer on
Congress power to incorporate a moneyed institution of any description. ।
1 will now proceed to examine arguments—-not ofa constitutional charac
ter, nor strictly applicable—but nevertheless frequently appealed to by the
advocates of a national bank. I allude to that class of arguments which
rest on precedent alone for support. The friends arid champions of a
United States bank, when no longer able to find legitimate support, when
forced to abandon every constitutional position, seek refuge in the misty
regions of precedent. The acts of former legislatures, and the opinions of
the Supreme Court, and not the constitution, are appealed'to for authority:
and Io f King Precedent is anointed with the unction of infallibility; be
comes the keeper of their consciences, and the object of their idolatry; his
behests the laws, his standard the missletoe, which these political Druids
venerate. But to vary the figure—what is there in the character or nature
pf precedent so sanative and holy that can heal all moral maladies, and
justify all political transgressions'? Or; wherefore is it, that precedent
should fetter the intellect, destroy moral"agency, and bear sway where
reason and conscience should alone' preside ? Sir, would it not be well for
those who Have sworn to’support the constitution, to pause’and reflect be
fore they subscribe to a doctrine so* fraught with mischief; and* so inimical
to reason?
: It is alleged, by,some of the servile brain-bound slaves of precedent, that
Congress would be justified in chartering'a bank, (at the present time,)
whether authorized by the'constitution or not, because similar institutions
have hitherto existed.’ THey ’bontehd, that inasmuch as those institutions
were established by‘Congress, submitted to by the people,'acquiesced in by
the States,’and sanctioned byhhe Supreme Court, that they were'recognis
ed by all the acts which’ imply the sanction of organic law. Sir, I cannot,
for one, yield assented dbetrmes'!so false, so loose,' so licentious. I deny
that the great body of.the American people,’the democracy,, are,- or ever
weye^in favor of a chartered money monopoly, whether States or national.
The insinuation is a rank and insolent
patriotism, their intel
ligence, and "their integrity. " No/'sif, the frank and honest hearted demo-

crals of this country utterly reject and abhor the doctrine, that time or pre
cedent can sanctify iniquity, or justify any infraction of the social compact.
It is contended by another, but similar class of moralists,-that the consti
tution ought to be so construed, as to expand with the growth of the coun
try, and conform to its diversified and mutable relations. Against this doc
trine, also, I enter my protest. It is too ductile to be either safe or sound;
too liable to be drawn out to dangerous lengths, and bent to mischievous
purposes. Sir, what is the nature of the obligation under which we act?
What is required of us before entering upon our duties as representatives?
It is required, by the constitution, that “ the Senators and Representatives,
and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all Executive
and Judicial officers, both of the United Stales, and of the several States,
shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.” Sir,
the requisition is emphatic and positive—couched in language not to be
misunderstood. Our duty is palpable—we cannot err ignorantly. We
are bound, by all the obligations which an oath imposes, to 11 support this
constitution.” We are not required to “support” the forced constructions
that may be given by a pliant court, or by a careless or venal legislature.
We are not called upon to “support” a constitution corrupted by congres
sional interpolations, or distorted and sophisticated by the legal mumme
ries of the bar or the bench. Nor are we obligated to support a constitu
tion that may be construed to change with times and circumstances; that
may grow with the growth, and decay with the decline of the country:
but we are bound by our solemn oaths or affirmations to “ support this con
stitution” in its purity and integrity, unsophisticated and uncontaminated.
Sir, there are two classes of men in this world, who rely upon precedent,
and who seem to believe in its infallibility, with a great deal of spirit and
perseverance. The one, the morally lax, who have no objection to trans
gress, provided they can find a pretext in precedent; the other, the mental
ly indolent, who find less labor in adopting the opinions of others, than in
analyzing and investigating for themselves ; while the rigidly honest and in
tellectually industrious, spurn all mental tyranny, refusing, in all cases, to
yield their assent but as the result of their conviction. Sir, let me not be
misunderstood when I say that precedent is dangerous and pernicious ; I
mean that it is so when regarded as an obligatory rule in matters of legis
lation, and' in the common affairs of life. In courts of justice, in the
dispensation of civil and criminal law, it may, to a certain extent, be
advantageously referred to as a guide. For so diversified and com
plicated are the subjects of litigation, that it is impossible for the leg
islator to anticipate and provide for every case that may occur. It be
comes the duty, therefore, of the judge, the organ of the law, not
only to proclaim the written law of the land, but also to decide in
cases where no statutory provision has been made, as reason and justice
may dictate. Nor, as a general rule, ought decisions thus made be
lightly regarded by succeeding judges, especially in cases where the points
in litigation are analogous. But, sir, while 1 willingly admit that pre
cedent may be properly referred to as authority in the administration of
the law, I utterly deny that it is necessarily obligatory upon legislative
bodies. It matters not, therefore, whether a precedent in favor of a United
States bank be found in the acts of former legislatures, or in the decisions
of the Supreme Court; it is, in either case, incompetent to control the acts
of this body. Congress, I trust, will never be willing to acknowledge the

19
binding force of precedent, in the decision of constitutional questions. Bu
sir, admitting, for the sake of argument, precedent to be good authority,
what does it prove in this case ? I apprehend that it would rather make
against than in favor of a bank. We find, in 1811, when a renewal of
the charter granted in 1791 was applied for, that its constitutionality was
discussed, and that the application was rejected. And further, when the
bank petitioned Congress for time to wind up its affairs, the petition was
referred to a committee who reported against the application, urging that
it was unconstitutional, and the report was concurred in. In 1813, when
the subject of a bank was again before Congress, and while under discus
sion in the House of Representatives, a distinguished gentleman from
Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) then a member of the House, declared in
his place, while opposing the bank, that the renewal of the bank charter
had been refused, because it was unconstitutional; and Congress again
decided against a bank. In 1832, the bill to renew the charter granted
in 1816 was vetoed by the late President, and subsequently rejected by
Congress, both alleging that it was unconstitutional: So that the pre
cedents. so far as the action of Congress is concerned, are equal. If refer
ence be had to the States, we shall find that a large majority of them have
been opposed, on constitutional ground, to a United States bank. What
ever authority, therefore, may attach to precedent, makes against a bank.
But the Supreme Court has decided that Congress have power to incor
porate a bank; and these decisions are appealed to with as much apparent
triumph, by the advocates of a national bank, as if the decrees of that
court were binding on Congress, and settled the constitutional question
forever. Sir, what are we to understand from this? Is it meant to be
insinuated that the three departments of Government are not co-ordinate,
and that the judiciary is clothed with the exclusive attributes of
supremacy ? that neither the Executive nor the Legislative Departments
are allowed to judge of their own powers, when acting within their
appropriate spheres, and in the discharge of their official duties? Is it
intended that the understandings, the oaths, and the consciences of the
other two departments, are to be silenced and overawed by the despotic
fiat of the bench ? This heretical, servile, and detestable doctrine is indus
triously propagated, I am aware ; not boldly and openly, but clandestinely
and insidiously, by hints, inuendoes, and mysterious givings out. God
forbid, patriotism forbid, that it should ever be acknowledged by the Execu
tive or Legislative Departments, or received by the American people.
For one, I reject it with disdain. I deny, and defy mortal man to prove,
that the decision of the Supreme Court can settle a constitutional question
in any other than in a judicial sense. It cannot affect legislation—cannot
control the decisions of Congress, or of the Executive—cannot control the
sovereign and absolute power of the people, nor of their representatives.
It is just as much the province of Congress, or of the Executive, to decide
upon the constitutionality of any matter that may properly come before them
for their action, as it is for the judiciary when it comes before them for
decision. Congress is no more bound by the opinions of the Supreme J udges
than are the judges by the opinions of Congress. The constitution vests “ the
judicial power in a Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.” In all instances, therefore,
where suits are prosecuted in the courts of the United States, of which the
courts have jurisdiction, and decided by the Sdpieme Court, all such

decisions are final. That being the court of the last resort, the parties
cannot appeal, but in all cases are bound to abide by such decision. But,
as has been before remarked, no decision of the Supreme Court can be
obligatory upon either of the other co-ordinate departments. When either
is called to the discharge of its appropriate duties, that branch, and not
the Supreme Court, is the judge, under the constitution, of its own acts.
Nor arc the decisions of the Executive or Legislative Departments binding
upon the judges of the Supreme Court, when acting within their appro
priate spheres. So long as each of the several departments acts as a check
upon the other, there is less danger of the abuse of power—whether spring
ing from ignorance or unlawful ambition. But, it may be asked, how consti
tutional questions are to be settled in the event of a n on-concurrence of
opinion in the co-ordinate departments? I answer—by the people through
the ballot boxes. For let it be borne in mind, that this Government is
emphatically a Government of the people : it emanates from the people—
its powers are granted by the people, and are to be exercised for their bene
fit ; and, so far at least as the representative department is concerned, in pur
suance of their instructions, whenever they may think proper to exercise
the right. All the departments of Government, the Executive, the Legis
lative, and the Judiciary, were established by the people to transact their
business, agreeably to the powers bestowed. Consequently, when contra
dictory opinions are entertained by the several departments, with regard to
the extent of their constitutional powers, the people are the only tribunal
to which the matter in dispute can be properly referred; and their decision,
proclaimed through the ballot box, must be final and conclusive. I am
aware, sir, that this doctrine will not be very popular in certain quarters;
but I conceive it, nevertheless, to be in accordance with the genius and
spirit of our institutions, and maintainable upon strict democratic prin
ciples.
ft being admitted, then, that the several departments are co-ordinate, and
their opinions, therefore, not binding upon each other, it remains to be
considered what weight is due to the decisions of the judiciary in favor of
the constitutionality of a United States bank? Sir, whatever importance I
might be willing to attach to the opinions of such an enlightened tribunal
on doubtful and intricate subjects, I am unwilling to concede to them aeontrolling influence in the decision of a question like the one under discussion,
when I am furnished with a written constitution for my guide, and in
which every delegated power is distinctly and accurately delineated, both
to the natural and the mental eye.
Sir, I have examined this instrument intently, anxiously, and, I trust,
honestly; but no where do I find in it a power to grant charters of incor
poration. Sir, I affirm, and hold that I am able to maintain, in defiance of
all the arts of sophistry and mystification, that the convention which fram
ed the constitution did neither grant any express power authorizing Con
gress to charter a national bank, nor intend that any powrer whatever,
whether incidental or otherwise, should be exercised for such purpose.
And, further, that the convention positively rejected a direct proposition to
empower Congress to incorporate a national bank, and repeatedly rejected
written propositions to grant charters of incorporation. But let us first ex
amine for a moment the ground assumed by the judiciary, in arguing the
constitutionality of a national bank. By reference to a decision had in the
case of McCulloch against the State of Maryland, it will be found that the
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principles upon which the judiciary rely, are substantially the same which
prevailed in ,1791, and ushered into being the first United States bank.
The main point of the argument of Gen. Hamilton, as well as that of the
Supreme Court, in support of the constitutionality of a bank, turns upon
the alleged necessity of the measure. The judges, as I understand them,
acknowledge the absence of all express constitutional authority, ad
mit that the power can only be derived by implication, and only exercised
■on the ground of a just necessity. That is, a bank is constitutional, if it
be necessary to carry into'execution any of the express powers ; but, if not
necessary to that end, or if that end can be attained by other appropriate
means, then it is not constitutional, the power to incorporate not being ex
pressly granted to Congress. Upon this hypothesis Congress have no con
stitutional power to charter a national bank, if such bank be not absolutely
and indispensably necessary to the execution of a specified power. Query:
Would even the necessity of the/measure justify its adoption, without an
amendment to the constitution?' But, sir, it yet remains to be shown, that
a national bank is an essential mean of executing any of the enumerated
powers ; and, until this be done, the opinions of the judiciary avail noth
ing. Whatever may be the general principle affirmed.by them, their argu
ments neither make for, nor against, the constitutionality of a national bank.
It is affirmed by the Supreme Court, in the case already alluded to, that
“the government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it
the duty of performing that act, must be allowed to select the means.” Sir,
I am constrained to doubt the validity of this doctrine when carried to its
full extent. Suppose we put it to the test. It is not only the right, but the
duty of Congress, to “regulate commerce.” Does it. follow, that they have
the right to make use of what means they please, in order to accomplish
that end ? If so, they may incorporate a company for that purpose, alleg
ing that an act of incorporation is a necessary mean for the attainment of
the end proposed. In other words, that the regulation of commerce
could not be so well effected in any other way. And why not? There
is no constitutional difficulty in the way that may not be surmounted
with the ladder of construction. And if Congress should only hap
pen to think that a chartered company would be the best mean to “regu
late commerce,” what would there be to prevent such incorporation?
According to the position assumed by the Supreme Court, you can first
raise this power from an incident, and then consider it.a principal—
confer on it the. power of legislative procreation, and authorize the mother
institution-to propagate her bastard progeny in every State and Territory
in the Union. And why not, I say? You have all the authority in favor
of it’ which precedent can furnish, in the charter of the late United States
bank. That institution had the power conferred upon it by Congress of
multiplying its progeny at pleasure. It had the power, by virtue of its char
ter, to establish branch banks, without the consent of the States, whenever
and wheresoever it pleased. It had the legislative power delegated to it by
Congress, in defiance of the checks and restraints which the American con
stitutions interpose, of creating, at its option, other banks and other direc
tors; and this power received the sanction of the judiciary. If Congress
possessed the constitutional power to incorporate a moneyed institution,
such as the late United States bank, it may also possess the power to char
ter a company, and endow it with the faculty of legislative fecundity, to re
gulate the commerce of the country. Only let Congress.adopt the princi-
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pie, tliat they have the power to select what means they please, in order to
carry into execution a specific power, and all the limitations—all the re
straints which the grant of delegated powers impose, are broken down and
subverted forever. Sir, I must be permitted to say, that I consider this
doctrine not only false, but dangerous to liberty. The exercise of a discre
tionary power, in the selection of means, must necessarily be limited to
such means as are strictly proper; and no means that are incompatible
with the principles upon which our Government is founded, can hoproper,
however convenient they may be. A chartered monopoly is not—cannot
be & proper mean to carry into effect any of the ends of a government based
on the principles of political equality. Would you consider the exercise of
exclusive political privileges as an appropriate means to promote the prin
ciple of equal political rights ? The idea is absurd upon the very face of it.
Mr. Chairman, I would not wantonly assail the reputation of the judiciary.
I trust that ! am capable of fairly and honestly appreciating the character of
that enlightened and honorable tribunal. But however highly I may esteem
them for purity of purpose and integrity of character, I cannot,'with the evi
dence before me, regard them as unerring m judgment: and I trust that the
day is far distant when they will be recognised by Congress, or the American
people, as a body of wfallibles. Sir, I believe that I am justified in say
ing, that the circumstances which surround and necessarily operate upon
the American judiciary, are unpropitious to liberty; the nature of their
office, the tenure by which it is held, and the fact of their non-accounta
bility to the people, must—on the known principles of human nature—■
have a tendency to render them covetous of power, arbitrary and despotic.
Nor is this all. Indoctrinated from their youth, in the principles and pre
judices of English jurists; educated in English books; ever consulting
English authorities ; constantly familiar with monarchical doctrines ; in a
word, ah the laws of mental association, under which their intellects are
reared and fashioned, are inimical to that broad based and high toned free-^
dom which the American people delight to cherish. Nor will the truth of
this position be doubted or denied, by those who are familiar with the his
tory of the past; who have studied the springs of human action ; reflected
upon the nature of human power: and observed its constant proneness to
enlarge, or overleap its boundaries. But why appeal to hypotheses, when
I can so readily summon facts to my aid ? The history of the Supreme
Court is rife with testimony directly to the point. By a careful examina
tion and analysis of its decisions, it will be found, that they have, in most
instances, leaned to the side of federal power; overlooked the rights of the
citizen and of the States ; and evinced a strong and uniform bias for a con
solidated Government. The alien and sedition laws—notoriously uncon
stitutional, and so pronounced by Mr. Jefferson and the American people—
received the sanction of that court. The sedition, or “gag law,” made it
an offence, punishable by indictment, to publish any thing which even had
a tendency to bring into disrepute the officers of the Government • and
many worthy and patriotic citizens, were, in pursuance of that nefarious
law, incarcerated for daring to complain of the oppressions of their rulers.
And this law, unconstitutional as it was, and .subversive of the rights of the
citizens^and of the principles of our Government as it was, received the
judicial sanction of the Supreme Court. Sir, I will hazard the declaration,
and without the fear of contradiction, that, if all the principles which have
received the sanction of the judiciary, were now in full force arid operation,
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the American people—bereft of all the blessings of a free Constitution—■
would, at this moment, be writhing under the unmitigated oppressions of a
heartless, ruthless despotism. And yet, sir, strange as it may appear, there
are those among us, notwithstanding their knowledge of this truth, and
notwithstanding all the judicial libels upon the constitution, which are plain
to their eyes and to their understandings, who still cleave to that tribunal
with all the zeal and enthusiasm of infatuation—regard it as the exclusive
depository of wisdom, of freedom, of patriotism—and its decrees as infallible, fixed, and immutable, as the fiat of fate.
But, sir, I will bring the decisions of the judiciary to a decisive test, viz:
the intentions of the framers of the constitution with regard to such insti
tution. And here, then, I wish it to be borne in mind, that the judiciary
have uniformly admitted that the power to incorporate a national bank
was not among the enumerated powers of the constitution, and that it could
only be derived by implication. In admitting that the power in question
was an implied, and not an express power, they necessarily assume that
the framers of the constitution intended to vest in Congress a power which
they omitted to specify ; for surely it could not be pretended by an intelli
gent body of men, such as compose our judiciary, that Congress possessed
the constitutional power to do an act which the constitution no where
expressly authorizes, and which the framers of that instrument evidentlyintended to interdict. This doctrine of construction, therefore, rests
entirely upon the known or supposed intentions of the convention which
framed the constitution. It is incumbent, therefore, on those who allege,
in the absence of all direct authority, that Congress possess an implied
power to incorporate a national bank, to show, at least, that the convention
did not intentionally withhold the said power from Congress. Now, sir, if
this cannot be done, but, on the contrary, if it can be proved that the subject
in question was agitated in the convention which framed the constitution,
that propositions were there made to invest Congress with power to
charter a bank, and that all propositions having that object in view were
rejected by the convention, it necessarily follows, that Congress possess no
such power, whether express or implied—the decision of the Supreme Court
to the contrary notwithstanding. I then take this ground ; that inasmuch
as there is no express constitutional authority given to Congress to charter
a bank, and as the framers of the constitution repeatedly and deliberately
rejected all propositions to vest in Congress power to grant acts of incorpo
ration of whatever description, that Congress, therefore, are as virtually
and morally prohibited from granting a bank charter (in its national capa
city) as if the constitution contained an express prohibitory clause with re
gard to it. I repeat, that this is my ground; and if I can show that the
framers of the constitution did not intend to vest in Congress power to
grant acts of incorporation of any kind, but designedly withheld such
power, then the constitutional right to charter a bank, does not, and cannot,
belong to Congress. In order to show what were the views entertained on
the subject of a national bank, as well as of every other species of incorpo
ration, by the framers of the constitution, it will be necessary to consult the
journal of the convention, as well as the statements of several of the dele
gates after the convention rose. But previous to introducingthese authori
ties, I will state.—what is already known to the committee—that there were
two parties in the convention who held opposing views relative to the form
and character of the government proposed to be established. The one, ad-
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vocated.a supreme national or consolidated, the other, a federal form of
government. The latter eventually triumphed. The friends of a supreme
government, after being defeated in ajl their direct efforts, endeavored to
accomplish their purpose by indirect means, as fully appears by the fol
lowing extract from “ Taylor’s New Views of the Constitution
August. 18. It was proposed to empower the legislature of the United States, (the word
national is now dropt,) ‘io grant charters of incorporation in eases where the public good
‘ may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent; to establish a.
‘ university ; to encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement' of useful
‘knowledge and discoveries; to establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the
‘ arts and sciences; to grant charters of incorporation ; to establish institutions, rewards, and
‘ immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures; and to regulate‘stages on the post-roads,’which, with other propositions, were referred to the committee of
July 23d.
September 14. ‘Question. To grant letters of incorporation for canals, et cetera; nega‘lived. To establish a university; negatived!’‘
Their rejection was a necessary consequence of substituting a federal for the national
Government, zealously contended .for, from the 29th of May to'the 14th of September. It was
obvious that powers to establish corporations, prescribe the mode of education, patronise local
improvements, and bestow rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture,
commerce, and manufactures, would certainly swallow up a federal, and introduce a national
Government. When, therefore, a.federal system obtained the preference, it would have been
inconsistent with the high degree of intelligence possessed by the members of the convention,
to have permitted their determination to be defeated by these indirect attempts. This intelli
gence was assailed by the soothing but insidious restriction, that the powers to incorporate,
grant exclusive privileges, and exercise every species of patronage, w’ere onlyto be exercised
“ in cases where the public good may require it.” Tlie same soothing bitt insidious argument
is now addressed to the intelligence of the‘public, to justify an exercise of the very powers
which the intelligence of the convention withheld from a federal Government; and whether
the promise of public good,has been fallacious or‘fulfilled by the monopolies of currency, of
manufactures, and the extension of federal patronage, the public can decide. Yet, Whatever
may have been their temporary effect, it is obvious that the enlightened framers of the consti
tution considered the condition of public good, as an enlargement and not a restriction of
power; and that it would defeat all the limitations of the constitution, by which a federal
Government could be formed or sustained. It was a pretext wdiich would fit every encroach
ment or usurpation; and no' powers could be more indefinite and sovereign than those of
granting exclusive privileges, bestowing rewards and immunities upon the three comptehensive interests of society, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and patronising capitalists;
paupers, knowledge, and ignorance. Such a nest of powers, though exhibited as sleepingin the
bed of public good, bore so strong a resemblance to the old bed ofjustice in Fiance, which was the
repository of evil as well as good, that they were all rejected. It was evident that they would
Le sufficient to re-hatch the strangled national form of government; and the convention having
finally preferred the federal form, thought that no good to the public could result from such
powers, which would recompense it for the evils it would sustain from the subversion ol that
form. The convention saw, that if Congress could exercise such powers, for the public good,
it might, upon the same ground, usurp any powers whatsoever, and in rejecting the proposi
tions, decided between investing that body with a general or limited federal authority. Hence
the power to regulate commerce was not intended to revive the iejected propositions to em
power Congress to bestow rewards upon agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Hence
the rejected proposition, to empower Congress to direct the exercise of the judicial power,
cannot enable it to extend the jurisdiction of the supreme court. And for the same reason, a
power to make war, cannot revive the rejected power to make canals, or to perforin any of
those et ceteras, whatever they were, referred to by the journal. If these swet ping and indefi
nite sovereign powers, or all powers thought by those who exercise them to be necessary for
he public good, with an et cetera besides, though proposed and rejected, do yet pass to Congress
under the constitution ; then the battle between the national and federal parties in the con ven
ion, terminated quite contrary to the usual course of things; the vanquished were victorious,
and the victorious were vanquished : and if they were now alive, one party would be as much
surprised to discover, that it had carried the consolidating propositions which it had lost, as the
other, that it had lost the federal principles which it carried. The spectacle of the slain rising
up alive, and the living falling down dead, could not have been expected by either.
No powers can be more sovereign and arbitrary, than those of deciding and doing whatever
may administer to the public good, and of pilfering private property by privileges, partialities,
premiums, monopolies, rewards, and immun ties; nor more capable of reaching any end.
Had the rejection of such powers been unnecessary for the security of a federal form of
Government^ the convention might have still been justifiable for the act, as deeming them
tyrannical, fraudulent, and oppressive. Fid the convention reject them in fad, and replant
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them in masquerade 1 I discern no evidence in the journal to excite such a suspicion. Colonel
Hamilton, far. from discerning the supposed ingenuity of sinking a national form of Govern
ment'in alakebf obsciirity, to be fished upfiy a'long Tine0 of constructions, when’it might be
safer to avow the intentions, seems'to have' quitted the convention in despair, soon after the
failure of his project. Mr. Randolph, undoubtedly influenced by having lo'st his plan also,
refused to sign the constitution. And though Mr. Madison and Colonel Hamilton both signed
it, and. Mr. Randolph supported it in the Virginia convention, they must have been influencedby the patriotic motive of effecting some good,'though'they-could not accomplish 'all <which
they attempted.. These are strong reasons to proVe; that the gentlemen who ha’d contended for.- ;
a supreme national Government, ahd 'of whose’ propositions for that purpose, not'one was
adopted by the constitution, did not imagine they had succeeded.”

It appears that the indirect and insidious means (which were intended
to be exercised through the medium of incorporations and exclusive privi
leges,) of the consolidationists, to establish a supreme national government,
shared the same fate in the convention, as did. their more open and direct
efforts. But, sir, let us proceed to examine the evidence, on the point, in
question, in the order in which it stands on the journal of the convention :
On the 29th of May, the third day after the convention had formed a quo
rum, Mr. Pinckney, delegate from South Carolina, submitted the plan of a
constitution, in which he proposed to bestow on Congress the power, “ to
borrow money,” &c., &c; After various propositions, plans and resolu
tions, had been sufficiently debated:
“ It was moved and seconded that the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of
a national government, except what respects the supreme executive, be referred to a committee
for the purpose of reporting a constitution, conformably to the proceedings aforesaid—which
passed unanimously in the affirmative.”

On the 24th of July, the committee, consisting of five, were chosen, and
on the 6th of August, the committee reported the “ draft of a constitution,”
and among other powers proposed to be given to Congress, were the follow
ing : “To lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, and emit bills on the
credit of the United States.”
On the 16th of August, when this “ draft of a constitution” was under
discussion, and particularly the-power last-above mentioned :
“ It was moved and seconded to strike out the words ‘ and emit bills’ out of the eighth clause
of the first section of the seventh article.—which passed in the affirmative.
“Yeas, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 9. Nays, New Jersey, Maryland, 2.

The convention, after having denied to Congress the power to emit bills
of credit—which power had been possessed by the confederation—-deemed
proper to extend a like prohibition to the State governments; this subject
was decided on the 28th day of August, when the 12th article was under
consideration:
“ It was moved and seconded to insert the words “nor emit bills of credk,” after the word
“money,” which passed in the affirmative.”

On the 18th of August, as has already been shown, two different propo
sitions Were niadb to authorize Congress to grant acts of incorporation, and
were both rejected. , On the 14th of September, the power, to create corpo
rations was again proposed, to:be vested in Congress, but was again, and
for the1 third and last time, rejected, (see journal.) Thus for the journal of
the convention. I would1 now ask the attention of the committee to the
statements made by thejmembers of. the convention.
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Luther Martin..a-delegate from the State of Maryland, in his disclosures
to the legislature of that State, makes the following remarks:
“ By our original articles of confederation, the Congress have power to borrow money and
emit bills of credit on the credit of the United States; agreeable to which was the report on this
system as made by the committee of detail. When we came to this part of the report, a motion
was made to strike out the words ‘ to emit bills of credit;’ against the motion we urged, that
it would be improper to deprive the Congress of that power; that it would be a novelty unpre
cedented to establish a government which should not have such authority. That it was impos
sible to look forward into futurity solar as to decide, that events might not happen th at should ren
der the exercise of such a power absolutely necessary; and that we doubted, whether if a war
should take place it would be possible for this country to defend itself, without having recourse
to paper credit, in which case there would be a necessity of becoming a prey to our enemies,
or violating the constitution of our government; and that, considering the administration of the
government would be principally in the hands of the wealthy, there could be little reason to
fear an abuse of the power by an unnecessary or injurious exercise of it. But, sir, a majority
of;the convention, being wise beyond every event, and being willing to risk any political evil
rather than admit the idea of a paper emission, in any possible case, refused to trust this authori
ty to a government, to which they were lavishing the most unlimited powers of taxation, and
to the mercy of which they were willing blindly to trust the liberty and property of the citizens
of every State in the Union; and they erased that clause from the system.”—Elliot’s Debates,
vol. l,p. 413.
“By the tenth section, every State is prohibited from emitting bills of credit. As it was reported
by the committee of detail, the States were only prohibited from emitting them without the con
sent of Congress: but the convention was so smitten with the paper money dread, that they in
sisted the prohibition should be absolute. It was my opinion, sir, that the States ought not to
be totally deprived of the right to emit bills of credit, and that as we had not given an authority
to the General Government for that purpose, it was the more necessary to retain it in the States.
1 considered that this State, and some others, have formerly received great benefit from paper
emissions, and that if public and private credit should once more be restored, such emissions may
hereafter be equally advantageous ; and further, that it is impossible to foresee that events may
not take place which shall render paper money of absolute necessity; and it was my opinion if
this power was not to be exercised by a State without the permission of the General Government
it ought to be satisfactory even to those who were the most haunted by the apprehensions of pa
per money-; I therefore thought it my duty to vote against this part of the system.
“ The same section, also, puts it out of the power of the States to make any thing but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or to pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts.”—lb. p. 422;
“March the Wth, 1798.— When the bank bill was under discussion in the House of Repre
sentatives, Judge Wilson came in, and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of
the following fact which passed in “the grand convention.” Among the enumerated powers
given to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It was on debate struck out. Several par
ticular powers were then proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress
a power to establish a national bank. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, observing that it was
extremely doubtful whether the constitution they were framing could ever be passed at all by
the people of America; that to give it Us best chance, however, they should make it as palata
ble as possible, and put nothing into it not very essential, which might raise up enemies; that
his colleague (Robert Morris) well knew that ‘a bank’ was in their State (Pennsylvania)
the very watch word of party; that a bank had been the great bone of contention between the
two parties of the State, from the establishment of their constitution, having been erected, put
down, erected again, as either party preponderated; that, therefore, to insert this power, would
instantly enlist against the whole instrument, the whole of the anti-bank party in Pennsylvania.
Whereupon it was rejected, as was every other special power, except that of giving copy
rights to authors, and patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled
down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.—Jefferson’s Memoirs.”

Now, sir, let us consider, for a moment, the several statements made by
the delegates to the convention, and of Mr. Jefferson, in connexion with the
evidence contained in the journal, and see if an array of testimony be not
presented in opposition to the unfounded and impudent assumption—that
it was the intention of the convention to authorize Congress to “emit bills
of credit”—that is decisive and overwhelming. It appears by the disclo
sures of Luther Martin, as well as by the original journal, that propositions
were repeatedly made, in the convention, to authorize Congress to emit
“ bills of credit,” and that all propositions to that effect, were most signally

rejected ! It is expressly stated by the Attorney General of Maryland, that
a majority of the convention l- were willing to risk any political evil, rather
than admit the idea of a paper emission in any possible case f and that
they (the convention) “ erased that clause from the system?’ And again,
when speaking of the extension of the prohibition to the States, he re
marks : that ££ the convention were so smitten with the paper money dread,
that they insisted the prohibition should be absolute!” So that both Con
gress and the States, as we have already seen, are prohibited by the consti
tution from “emitting bills of credit;” or from issuing paper money, £! in
any possible case.” It is contended by Mr. Gallatin, in his “ Considera
tions on the Currency,” &c. that bank bills and bills of credit are one and
the same thing. He remarks: “ the constitution of the United States pro
hibits every State from issuing bills of credit; now, the bills emitted by a
bank.” he adds, “are to all intents and purposes bills of credit.” And hence
he concludes, that the State which creates such bank, violates the constitu
tion. If the bills issued by State banks, are to all intents and purposes
“bills of credit,” in the constitutional sense, as Mr. Gallatin contends—and
I am not disposed to dispute the point with him at present—then would
bills issued by a United States bank, also be bills of credit. If a State,
therefore, by issuing bills of credit, or by incorporating a bank for that pur
pose, violates the constitution, Congress by doing the same thing, equally
violates that instrument; because, as has already been shown, the power
to “ emit bills of credit” was withheld from Congress as well as from the
States. The reason why a prohibitory clause was not incorporated into
the constitution in relation to the United States, as well as to the State Gov
ernments, is obvious. By the articles of confederation, Congress were ex
pressly authorized to “ emit bills of credit.” This power had been exer
cised by Congress, and the evil effects resulting from it, in the shape of
continental money, were in evidence before the members of the convention
at the time of framing the constitution. The framers of the constitution,
admonished by the history of the past, wisely and patriotically endeavored
to guard their country from a similar evil in future, by excluding from the
new constitution, the power which had been conferred on Congress by the
articles of confederation, as well as by prohibiting the exercise of that
power to the State Governments.
Congress are, by the constitution, not only deprived of the power of
“ emitting bills of credit,” or of “ issuing paper money in any possible
case,” but expressly limited in the exercise of their power, with regard to
the currency, to the coining of gold and silver, and to the regulation of
the value of foreign coin. And when Congress have done this, they have
done all that the constitution requires, ox permits them to do on the subject
of the currency.
Having shown that the power to “ emit bills of credit” is not delegated
to Congress, and that such was the “ dread of paper money” entertained
by the convention, that they withheld from Congress the power to issue, or
cause to be issued, such money “in any possible case.” I might dismiss
this part of the subject without further remark; but as it is my wish to
put an end to all doubt and cavil, 1 will, even at the hazard of using
tedious repetitions, again refer to the important fact, that it was repeatedly
proposed in convention to vest Congress with power to grant charters of
incorporation, and that all such propositions were rejected in every instance,
and under every modification. This position has been fully esta lbs

by the journal of the convention, as has-been already shown, as well as by
the statements of able and honorable members of that body. Mr. Madison,
in his reply to General Hamilton’s arguments in favor of a national bank,
informs Us that a power to grant charters of incorporation had been pro
posed: in the convention, and rejected.” . Messrs. Baldwin and, Wilson,
both distinguished members of the federal convention, have informed ns,
through Mr. Jefferson, that among the enumerated powers (<£ proposed to
be) given to Congress was one to erect corporations,”.and that “ it Was,on
deliberation, struck out.” And further, that P Robert Morris proposed to
give Congress power to establish a national bank” and that the proposi
tion was opposed by Gouverneur Morris^ on the ground that it would be
unpopular With' the people. This proposition was also rejected by the
convention. Well, sir, we are at length enabled satisfactorily to determine
whether a power to grant charters ■ of incorporation be a substantive or
incidental power. That it was not regarded as an incidental power by
those members of’the convention who were the advocates of incorporations,
is evident' from the fact, that they proposed to class it with the enumerated
and substantive powers. And that it was not considered, as incidental by
those members who opposed it. is equally manifest from the reasons urged,
by them’in debate against it. They opposed- it, not on the ground that it
could be derived by implication, but on the broad democratic principle,
that it was’incompatible-with the character of the government which they
had’been delegated to establish, and because its exercise would be dan
gerous to the liberties of the people. The position assumed by the
judiciary, therefore, that the power to charter, a national bank is an
incidental power, is condemned and contradicted by the unanimous sense
of the convention. The convention, by deliberately withholding from
Congress the power to’ grant charters of incorporation, for both general
and special purposes, thereby clearly and indisputably discountenanced
and condemned the principle. Yes, sir, it was the principle of exclusive
privileges and of chartered monopolies to which they were opposed, and
which they promptly, sternly rejected, as often as introduced, and in
whatsoever shape presented. And will it be pretended that the authors
of the constitution, after having thus repeatedly and unqualifiedly dis
approved and repudiated the principle, still recognised and approved it
in the shape of a bank charter—in its most dangerous,, revolting, and
malignant aspect ? Who is prepared to accuse the authors of the consti
tution with such palpable inconsistency, or culpable duplicity ? Sir, I am
compelled’to believe that the man who affirms that the framers of the
constitution, after having rejected all propositions to grant charters' of
incorporation, whether for general or special purposes, intended, at, the
same time, to authorize Congress to charter a national bank, holds in light
estimation, either the-character of that body, or his own honor. < Mr. Chairman, I will, in a few words; conclude my remarks on this
branch of the subject. It is’admitted, on. all hands, that ours is a govern
ment of specific-and limited-powers. . In the language of the constitution:
“ The powers not delegated to (he United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

The power to grant charters of incorporation was not delegated to Con
gress, nor intended to be so, by the convention which formed the constitu
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lion, and, consequently, cannot be exercised without.violating that instru
ment. And. with a perfect knowledge of this fact, with, a full and perfect
understanding, that the convention purposely -withheld .from Congress the
power to “emit bills of credit,v'or paper -money,
any possible case .
“that they also prohibited the granting of charters of incorporation of every
kind and description p I cannot,J say, with all that information before me,
consent to vote in favor of any” incorporation, and especially a bank charter,
which stands doubly condemned by the framers.of Uhe.constitution. No,
sir : were I to do $0, with the evidence before me,-I should consider that I
had sinned against light and knowledge—sinned past recovering and past
forgiveness, and should ever regard-myself as a ■perjured man—perjured
both in the eyes of God and of my country.
r ■
But, sir, the American peopleware -opposed to-a national bank,. The
knowledge of this fact—arid no man can plead ignorance with regard to
it—I should suppose would be a sufficient reason why the peoples’ repre
sentatives should oppose it. For my own part, sir, were I to support any
' measure which has been so generally, and-emphatically condemned by the
people, I should consider that I had grossly outraged public, opinion, in
sulted the majesty of the people,1 disregarded their express, wishes, and be“trayed their best interests? Andj sir, Icannot conceive-how any honorable
gentleman, who claims to be a republican—-who professeshhentertain a due
regard for public opinion, and a willingness to act in obedience to.the ex
pressed will of thdmajority— can possibly , yield his ;support to, a measure
that has been sb recently, so repeatedly, and so signallycondemned by that
majority. Shall I be told that-'-the people woulaUake.this new institution
into favor, provided it were established, and that they would cherish and
sustain it hereafter ? -Letmot gentlemen Jay the y flattering unction to their
souls.” No, sir,! the history of dhe late bank is too .fresh instheir recollec1 tions; The peopleof this country aretoo prudentand too»wise, not Jo be
admonishedand profitted by the teachings ©flhe pash. Th eyare too; jealous
of their rights—too much enamored'■ of-liberty^ .to regard, .with .favor, a
' monster that might,- at its pleasure, -violate1 tjiose^rights and ..crush that
liberty. ’ And gentlemen who act upon the supposition,, that.the American
pebple will ever become the-friends -and -willing supporters o.Lan .institutiori'so hostiledo the spirit- of freedom, err as widely as would have erred
: the'frieridshf hhe infant Bacchus, had- they commended, him to the. arms
of lJuno.for succot1 and protection.'' Hu.,<s-^- j.n
' But^ sif,” we are toM
the hoard of 1 trade,'' andothers friendly to. a na; tional bank, that the’generabwelfare of the country. requiresmt, our hands
the establishment of such an institution. For one, sir, I am disposed to
... doubt the correctness ofsthis--proposition.» I am ustrongly, inclined.,to the
‘opinion thatmodest pdfa^
not quite‘suwelk^ualifled;a§ they
imagine,to decide what - would,or what* would not, promote thepubhcgood.
I have yet to learn, that those gentlemen are more deeply skilled in the
science of government and of political economy, and that they cherish a
warmer regard for the public weal, than those of other pursuits and of a
different political faith. I have yet to learn that they are benevolent and
patriotic beyond their generation, or that they have been anointed with
the oil of wisdom above their fellows. Sir, whence comes their authority
to decide what measures shall, or shall not, be adopted in reference to the
general welfare ? When, and how were they constituted and appointed
conservators and guardians of the public interests, that they thus ape the
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not the great mass of the people had sufficient experience, with regard to a
national bank? have they not felt its benefits and its evils, its advantages
and disadvantages ; and have they not condemned it—1 had almost said,
with the voice of unanimity? And shall they be deemed incompetent to
judge of the utility, character, and tendency of such an institution ? Sir,
by what other criterion than that of public sentiment, clearly expressed and
fairly ascertained, shall we judge of a public measure? Shall We adopt
the views and opinions of the few, to the exclusion of the many? Shall
we not allow the groat majority to determine what is, as well as what is
not for their welfare? And have not that majority solemnly decreed, in a
voice that is still ringing in our ears, that a national bank is not a national
benefit, but a national evil; that it is not a public blessing, but a public
curse ? If we regard public sentiment, therefore, as a proper test of this
measure, we must necessarily decide against it. We are bound to believe
that it would not be productive of public good, as represented by the peti
tioners—but of public mischief, as declared by a majority of the people. It
will not be disputed, but that any class of citizens have a right to ask, at
the hands of Government, the adoption of such measures, or the enactment
of such laws, as may, in their opinion, subserve their interests: provided
always, that such measures, or laws, do not conflict with other interests of
the (State, or revolt the “ stomach of the public sense.” A national bank
does both; and has, consequently, no claims to the favorable regard of Con
gress.
Sir, let us consider, for a moment, whether we can look with safety or
propriety, for wise, patriotic, disinterested or salutary council from the
source whence the petitions and demands for a national bank proceed. Do
we find the patriotic, the clear-headed and honest-hearted yeomanry and me
chanics of the country clamoring for a national bank ? No sir; No—the
productive and laboring classes appreciate their political welfare too highly,
to desire such an institution. The great majority of bank advocates are to be
foundamong the non-producers—the traffickersandspeculators of thecountry
—'l children of lofty hopes and low desires,” most of whom are peculiarly
affected by the present pressure of the times. And would it be the part of
wisdom to give heed to counsel emanating from such sources ? Can it be
reasonably expected, that men relying solely upon bank facilities—men
suddenly disappointed in their high expectations of immediate wealth and
consequent influence, would be the most competent to direct the action of
Government and control the destinies of the nation, at such a conjuncture?
No, sir—their habits of life—of thinking—their peculiar situation—the cir
cumstances which influence their judgments and impel them to action—
all—all conspire to disqualify them for the task. We know, sir, that it is
more natural for men in affliction—whether, physical or political—to have
recourse to palliatives—to immediate and temporary expedients, than to
deliberate on the means necessary to secure permanent relief.

